This vital study offers a new interpretation of Hume's famous "Of Miracles," which notoriously argues against the possibility of miracles. By situating Hume's popular argument in the context of the 18th century debate on miracles, Earman shows Hume's argument to be largely unoriginal and chiefly without merit where it is original. Yet Earman constructively conceives how progress can be made on the issues that Hume's essay so provocatively posed about the ability of eyewitness testimony to establish the credibility (...) of marvelous and miraculous events. (shrink)

There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes's original paper to contemporary formal learning theory. (...) In a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. (shrink)

There is currently no viable alternative to the Bayesian analysis of scientific inference, yet the available versions of Bayesianism fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Bayes or Bust? provides the first balanced treatment of the complex set of issues involved in this nagging conundrum in the philosophy of science. Both Bayesians and anti-Bayesians will find a wealth of new insights on topics ranging from Bayes’s original paper to contemporary formal learning theory.In (...) a paper published posthumously in 1763, the Reverend Thomas Bayes made a seminal contribution to the understanding of "analogical or inductive reasoning." Building on his insights, modem Bayesians have developed an account of scientific inference that has attracted numerous champions as well as numerous detractors. Earman argues that Bayesianism provides the best hope for a comprehensive and unified account of scientific inference, yet the presently available versions of Bayesianisin fail to do justice to several aspects of the testing and confirming of scientific theories and hypotheses. By focusing on the need for a resolution to this impasse, Earman sharpens the issues on which a resolution turns. John Earman is Professor of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. (shrink)

Physicists who work on canonical quantum gravity will sometimes remark that the general covariance of general relativity is responsible for many of the thorniest technical and conceptual problems in their field.1 In particular, it is sometimes alleged that one can trace to this single source a variety of deep puzzles about the nature of time in quantum gravity, deep disagreements surrounding the notion of ‘observable’ in classical and quantum gravity, and deep questions about the nature of the existence of spacetime (...) in general relativity. Philosophers who think about these things are sometimes skeptical about such claims. We have all learned that Kretschmann was quite correct to urge against Einstein that the “General Theory of Relativity” was no such thing, since any theory could be cast in a generally covariant form, and hence the general covariance of general relativity could not have any physical content, let alone bear the kind of weight that Einstein expected it to.2 Friedman’s assessment is widely accepted: “As Kretschmann first pointed out in 1917, the principle of general covariance has no physical content whatever: it specifies no particular physical theory; rather, it merely expresses our commitment to a certain style of formulating physical theories” (1984, p. 44). Such considerations suggest that general covariance, as a technically crucial but physically contentless feature of general relativity, simply cannot be the source of any significant conceptual or physical problems.3 Physicists are, of course, conscious of the weight of Kretschmann’s points against Einstein. Yet they are considerably more ambivalent than their philosophical colleagues. Consider Kuchaˇr’s conclusion at the end of a discussion of this topic. (shrink)

Newton's Principia introduced conceptions of space and time that launched one of themost famous and sustained debates in the history of physics, a controversy that involves fundamentalconcerns in the foundations of physics, metaphysics, and scientific epistemology.This bookintroduces and clarifies the historical and philosophical development of the clash between Newton'sabsolute conception of space and Leibniz's relational one. It separates the issues and provides newperspectives on absolute relational accounts of motion and relational-substantival accounts of theontology of space time.Earman's sustained treatment and (...) imaginative insights raise to a new levelthe debate on these important issues at the boundary of philosophy and physics. He surveys thehistory of the controversy from Newton to Einstein develops the mathematics and physics needed topose the issues in sharp form and provides a persuasive assessment of the philosophical problemsinvolved.Most importantly, Earman revitalizes the connection of the debate to contemporary science.He shows, for example, how concerns raised by Leibniz form the core of ongoing debate on thefoundations of general theory of relativity, moving the discussion into a new and vital arena andintroducing arguments that will be discussed for years to come.John Earman is Professor of Historyand Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

In 1894 Pierre Curie announced what has come to be known as Curie's Principle: the asymmetry of effects must be found in their causes. In the same publication Curie discussed a key feature of what later came to be known as spontaneous symmetry breaking: the phenomena generally do not exhibit the symmetries of the laws that govern them. Philosophers have long been interested in the meaning and status of Curie's Principle. Only comparatively recently have they begun to delve into the (...) mysteries of spontaneous symmetry breaking. The present paper aims to advance the discussion of both of these twin topics by tracing their interaction in classical physics, ordinary quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. The features of spontaneous symmetry that are peculiar to quantum field theory have received scant attention in the philosophical literature. These features are highlighted here, along with an explanation of why Curie's Principle, though valid in quantum field theory, is nearly vacuous in that context. (shrink)

It has become something of a dogma in the philosophy of science that modern cosmology has completed Boltzmann's program for explaining the statistical validity of the Second Law of thermodynamics by providing the low entropy initial state needed to ground the asymmetry in entropic behavior that underwrites our inference about the past. This dogma is challenged on several grounds. In particular, it is argued that it is likely that the Boltzmann entropy of the initial state of the universe is an (...) ill-defined or severely hobbled concept. It is also argued that even if the entropy of the initial state of the universe had a well-defined, low value, this would not suffice to explain why thermodynamics works as well as it does for the kinds of systems we care about. Because the role of Boltzmann entropy in our inferences to the past has been vastly overrated, the failure of the Boltzmann program does not pose a serious problem for our knowledge of the past. But it does call a different explanation of why thermodynamics works as well as it does. A suggestion is offered for a different approach. (shrink)

Although the philosophical literature on the foundations of quantum field theory recognizes the importance of Haag’s theorem, it does not provide a clear discussion of the meaning of this theorem. The goal of this paper is to make up for this deficit. In particular, it aims to set out the implications of Haag’s theorem for scattering theory, the interaction picture, the use of non-Fock representations in describing interacting fields, and the choice among the plethora of the unitarily inequivalent representations of (...) the canonical commutation relations for free and interacting fields. (shrink)

Stephen Hawking has argued that universes containing evaporating black holes can evolve from pure initial states to mixed final ones. Such evolution is non-unitary and so contravenes fundamental quantum principles on which Hawking's analysis was based. It disables the retrodiction of the universe's initial state from its final one, and portends the time-asymmetry of quantum gravity. Small wonder that Hawking's paradox has met with considerable resistance. Here we use a simple result for C*-algebras to offer an argument for pure-to-mixed state (...) evolution in black hole evaporation, and review responses to the Hawking paradox with respect to how effectively they rebut this argument. (shrink)

In this first part of a two-part paper, we describe efforts in the early decades of this century to restrict the extent of violations of the Second Law of thermodynamics that were brought to light by the rise of the kinetic theory and the identification of fluctuation phenomena. We show how these efforts mutated into Szilard’s proposal that Maxwell’s Demon is exorcised by proper attention to the entropy costs associated with the Demon’s memory and information acquisition. In the second part (...) we will argue that the information theoretic exorcisms of the Demon provide largely illusory benefits. According to the case, they either return a presupposition that can be had without information theoretic consideration or they postulate a broader connection between information and entropy than can be sustained. (shrink)

The philosophical literature on time and change is fixated on the issue of whether the B-series account of change is adequate or whether real change requires Becoming of either the property-based variety of McTaggart's A-series or the non-property-based form embodied in C. D. Broad's idea of the piling up of successive layers of existence. For present purposes it is assumed that the B-series suffices to ground real change. But then it is noted that modern science in the guise of Einstein's (...) general theory poses a threat to real change by implying that none of the genuine physical magnitudes countenanced by the theory changes its value with time. The aims of this paper are to explain how this seemingly paradoxical conclusion arises and to assess the merits and demerits of possible reactions to it. (shrink)

Time in electromagnetism shares many features with time in other physical theories. But there is one aspect of electromagnetism's relationship with time that has always been controversial, yet has not always attracted the limelight it deserves: the electromagnetic arrow of time. Beginning with a re-analysis of a famous argument between Ritz and Einstein over the origins of the radiation arrow, this chapter frames the debate between modern Einsteinians and neo-Ritzians. It tries to find a clean statement of what the arrow (...) is and then explains how it relates to the cosmological and thermodynamic arrows, representing the most developed and sophisticated attack yet, in either the physics or philosophy literature, on the electromagnetic arrow of time. (shrink)

In this second part of our two-part paper we review and analyse attempts since 1950 to use information theoretic notions to exorcise Maxwell’s Demon. We argue through a simple dilemma that these attempted exorcisms are ineffective, whether they follow Szilard in seeking a compensating entropy cost in information acquisition or Landauer in seeking that cost in memory erasure. In so far as the Demon is a thermodynamic system already governed by the Second Law, no further supposition about information and entropy (...) is needed to save the Second Law. In so far as the Demon fails to be such a system, no supposition about the entropy cost of information acquisition and processing can save the Second Law from the Demon. (shrink)

Schrödinger averred that entanglement is the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics. The first part of this paper is simultaneously an exploration of Schrödinger’s claim and an investigation into the distinction between mere entanglement and genuine quantum entanglement. The typical discussion of these matters in the philosophical literature neglects the structure of the algebra of observables, implicitly assuming a tensor product structure of the simple Type I factor algebras used in ordinary Quantum Mechanics . This limitation is overcome by adopting the (...) algebraic approach to quantum physics, which allows a uniform treatment of ordinary QM, relativistic quantum field theory, and quantum statistical mechanics. The algebraic apparatus helps to distinguish several different criteria of quantum entanglement and to prove results about the relation of quantum entanglement to two additional ways of characterizing the classical versus quantum divide, viz. abelian versus non-abelian algebras of observables, and the ability versus inability to interrogate the system without disturbing it. Schrödinger’s claim is reassessed in the light of this discussion. The second part of the paper deals with the relativity-to-ambiguity threat: the entanglement of a state on a system algebra is entanglement of the state relative to a decomposition of the system algebra into subsystem algebras; a state may be entangled with respect to one decomposition but not another; hence, unless there is some principled way to choose a decomposition, entanglement is a radically ambiguous notion. The problem is illustrated in terms a Realist versus Pragmatist debate, the former claiming that the decomposition must correspond to real as opposed to virtual subsystems, while the latter claims that the real versus virtual distinction is bogus and that practical considerations can steer the choice of decomposition. This debate is applied to the fraught problem of measuring entanglement for indistinguishable particles. The paper ends with some remarks about claims in the philosophical literature that entanglement undermines the separability or independence of subsystems while promoting holism. (shrink)

On standard accounts of scientific theorizing, the role of idealizations is to facilitate the analysis of some real world system by employing a simplified representation of the target system, raising the obvious worry about how reliable knowledge can be obtained from inaccurate descriptions. The idealizations involved in the Aharonov–Bohm effect do not, it is claimed, fit this paradigm; rather the target system is a fictional system characterized by features that, though physically possible, are not realized in the actual world. The (...) point of studying such a fictional system is to understand the foundations of quantum mechanics and how its predictions depart from those of classical mechanics. The original worry about the use of idealizations is replaced by a new one; namely, how can actual world experiments serve to confirm the AB effect if it concerns the behavior of a fictional system? Struggle with this issue helps to account for the fact that almost three decades elapsed before a consensus emerged that the predicted AB effect had received solid experimental support. Standard accounts of idealizations tout the role they play in making tractable the analysis of the target system; by contrast, the idealizations involved in the AB effect make its analysis both conceptually and mathematically challenging. The idealizations required for the AB effect are also responsible for the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations of the canonical commutation relations and of the current algebra, representations which an observer confined to the electron’s configuration space could invoke to ‘explain’ AB-type effect without the need to posit a hidden magnetic field. The goal of this paper is to bring to the attention of the philosophers of science these and other aspects of the AB effect which are neglected or inadequately treated in literature. (shrink)

David Albert's Time and Chance (2000) provides a fresh and interesting perspective on the problem of the direction of time. Unfortunately, the book opens with a highly non-standard exposition of time reversal invariance that distorts the subsequent discussion. The present article not only has the remedial goal of setting the record straight about the meaning of time reversal invariance, but it also aims to show how the niceties of this symmetry concept matter to the problem of the direction of time (...) and to related foundation issues in physics. (shrink)

For much of this century, philosophers hoped that Einstein’s general theory of relativity would play the role of physician to philosophy. Its development would positively influence the philosophy of methodology and confirmation, and its ontology would answer many traditional philosophical debates—for example, the issue of spacetime substantivalism. In physics, by contrast, the attitude is increasingly that GTR itself needs a physician. The more we learn about GTR the more we discover how odd are the spacetimes that it allows. Not only (...) does GTR permit singularities, naked and clothed, but it allows time travel, topology change, and event and particle horizons, to name but a few of these oddities. Rather than revel in the riches of the theory, however, many physicists seek to rule out one or more of the above “pathologies” on the grounds that they are “physically unreasonable.” Thus contemporary researchers hawk various “cures” for the “illnesses” of GTR: among them, Chronology Protection to ensure against time travel, Cosmic Censorship for naked singularities, Inflation for horizons, and so on. The physics of these illnesses and cures, and the problems they engender, are the source of much controversy in the physics literature. Philosophers have largely neglected it. But clearly the subject needs philosophers of physics to determine whether the patient is genuinely ailing, and if so, to sift the real antidotes from the snake oil. (shrink)

On standard accounts of scientific theorizing, the role of idealizations is to facilitate the analysis of some real world system by employing a simplified representation of the target system, raising the obvious worry about how reliable knowledge can be obtained from inaccurate descriptions. The idealizations involved in the Aharonov–Bohm effect do not, it is claimed, fit this paradigm; rather the target system is a fictional system characterized by features that, though physically possible, are not realized in the actual world. The (...) point of studying such a fictional system is to understand the foundations of quantum mechanics and how its predictions depart from those of classical mechanics. The original worry about the use of idealizations is replaced by a new one; namely, how can actual world experiments serve to confirm the AB effect if it concerns the behavior of a fictional system? Struggle with this issue helps to account for the fact that almost three decades elapsed before a consensus emerged that the predicted AB effect had received solid experimental support. Standard accounts of idealizations tout the role they play in making tractable the analysis of the target system; by contrast, the idealizations involved in the AB effect make its analysis both conceptually and mathematically challenging. The idealizations required for the AB effect are also responsible for the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations of the canonical commutation relations and of the current algebra, representations which an observer confined to the electron’s configuration space could invoke to ‘explain’ AB-type effect without the need to posit a hidden magnetic field. The goal of this paper is to bring to the attention of the philosophers of science these and other aspects of the AB effect which are neglected or inadequately treated in literature. (shrink)

Although C. D. Broad's notion of Becoming has received a fair amount of attention in the philosophy-of-time literature, there are no serious attempts to show how to replace the standard 'block' spacetime models by models that are more congenial to Broad's idea that the sum total of existence is continuously increased by Becoming or the coming into existence of events. In the Newtonian setting Broad-type models can be constructed in a cheating fashion by starting with a Newtonian block model, carving (...) chips off the block, and assembling the chips in an appropriately structured way. However, attempts to construct Broad-type models in a non-cheating fashion reveal a number of problematic aspects of Becoming that have not received adequate attention in the literature. The paper then turns to an assessment of the problem and prospects of adapting Becoming models to relativistic spacetimes. The results of the assessment differ in both minor and major ways from the ones in the extant literature. Finally, the paper describes how the causal set approach to quantum gravity promises to provide a mechanism for realizing Becoming, though the form of Becoming that emerges may not conform to any of the versions discussed in the philosophical literature. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, requiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, determinism is an (...) excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude towards scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take determinism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evolution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism. From time to time I will comment on ways in which predictability can fail in a deterministic setting. Finally, my survey will concentrate on the Laplacian variety of determinism according to which the instantaneous state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. The plan of the survey is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fragility of determinism by means of a Zeno type example. Then sections 3 and 4 survey successively the fortunes of determinism in the Newtonian and the special relativistic settings.. (shrink)

The overaraching goal of this paper is to elucidate the nature of superselection rules in a manner that is accessible to philosophers of science and that brings out the connections between superselection and some of the most fundamental interpretational issues in quantum physics. The formalism of von Neumann algebras is used to characterize three different senses of superselection rules (dubbed, weak, strong, and very strong) and to provide useful necessary and sufficient conditions for each sense. It is then shown how (...) the Haag–Kastler algebraic approach to quantum physics holds the promise of a uniform and comprehensive account of the origin of superselection rules. Some of the challenges that must be met before this promise can be kept are discussed. The focus then turns to the role of superselection rules in solutions to the measurement problem and the emergence of classical properties. It is claimed that the role for “hard” superselection rules is limited, but “soft” (a.k.a. environmental) superselection rules or N. P. Landsman’s situational superselection rules may have a major role to play. Finally, an assessment is given of the recently revived attempts to deconstruct superselection rules. (shrink)

This the first part of a two‐part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. the Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base that, (...) we argue, enables HS to capture what is really stake in the debate, without taking on extraneous commitments. “I tend to picture the [facts of the form “it is a law that s” and “is is not a lw that s”] as having been sprinkled been sprinkled like powdered sugar over the doughy surface of the non‐nomic facts.”—Marc Lange2 “Avoid empty carbohydrates.”—Runner's World3. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a growing consensus in the philosophical community that the grandfather paradox and similar logical puzzles do not preclude the possibility of time travel scenarios that utilize spacetimes containing closed timelike curves. At the same time, physicists, who for half a century acknowledged that the general theory of relativity is compatible with such spacetimes, have intensely studied the question whether the operation of a time machine would be admissible in the context of the same theory and of (...) its quantum cousins. A time machine is a device which brings about closed timelike curves—and thus enables time travel—where none would have existed otherwise. The physics literature contains various no-go theorems for time machines, i.e., theorems which purport to establish that, under physically plausible assumptions, the operation of a time machine is impossible. We conclude that for the time being there exists no conclusive no-go theorem against time machines. The character of the material covered in this article makes it inevitable that its content is of a rather technical nature. We contend, however, that philosophers should nevertheless be interested in this literature for at least two reasons. First, the topic of time machines leads to a number of interesting foundations issues in classical and quantum theories of gravity; and second, philosophers can contribute to the topic by clarifying what it means for a device to count as a time machine, by relating the debate to other concerns such as Penrose's cosmic censorship conjecture and the fate of determinism in general relativity theory, and by eliminating a number of confusions regarding the status of the paradoxes of time travel. The present article addresses these ambitions in as non-technical a manner as possible, and the reader is referred to the relevant physics literature for details. (shrink)

This paper surveys the issue of relativistic causality within the framework of algebraic quantum field theory . In doing so, we distinguish various notions of causality formulated in the literature and study their relationships, and thereby we offer what we hope to be a useful taxonomy. We propose that the most direct expression of relativistic causality in AQFT is captured not by the spectrum condition but rather by the axiom of local primitive causality, in that it entails a form of (...) local determinism for quantum fields which generalizes the constraint of no superluminal propagation of classical field theories to relativistic quantum field theory. We discuss the status of the axiom of micro-causality by locating its place within a large family of separability/independence/locality conditions developed for AQFT and also by relating it to so-called no-signalling theorems. And we also provide a critical survey of attempts to understand the implications for relativistic causality of the distant correlations endemic to the states in models of AQFT satisfying the standard axioms, and we provide an assessment of attempts to employ Reichenbach's common cause principle in AQFT to defuse worries that these distant correlations implicate direct causal connections between relatively spacelike events. (shrink)

A common reaction to the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorems is that Einstein's general theory of relativity contains the seeds of its own destruction. This attitude is critically examined. A more tolerant attitude toward spacetime singularities is recommended.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I want to examine some rather curious arguments of Kant’s which purport to show that some alleged properties of space can be derived from some alleged facts about incongruous counterparts. Secondly, I want to give some preliminary answers to some important questions about the distinction between right and left and the nature of space and space-time which are raised by Kant’s argument. As a byproduct, I hope that the discussion will provide an (...) example of how science can illuminate philosophical issues and of how philosophy can at least lead one into interesting scientific issues. (shrink)

These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in the field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of (...) logical positivism early in the twentieth century. -/- Contents: -/- "Thoroughly Modern Meno," Clark Glymour and Kevin Kelly "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry," Jaakko Hintikka "Aristotelian Natures and Modern Experimental Method," Nancy Cartwright "Genetic Inference: A Reconsideration of "David Hume's Empiricism," Barbara D. Massey and Gerald J. Massey "Philosophy and the Exact Sciences: Logical Positivism as a Case Study," Michael Friedman "Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry," Noam Chomsky "Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method," Richard Boyd "Do We Need a Hierarchical Model of Science?" Diderik Batens "Theories of Theories: A View from Cognitive Science," Richard E. Grandy "Procedural Syntax for Theory Elements," Joseph D. Sneed "Why Functionalism Didn't Work," Hilary Putnam "Physicalism," Hartry Field. (shrink)

The ambition of this volume is twofold: to provide a comprehensive overview of the field and to serve as an indispensable reference work for anyone who wants to work in it. For example, any philosopher who hopes to make a contribution to the topic of the classical-quantum correspondence will have to begin by consulting Klaas Landsman’s chapter. The organization of this volume, as well as the choice of topics, is based on the conviction that the important problems in the philosophy (...) of physics arise from studying the foundations of the fundamental theories of physics. It follows that there is no sharp line to be drawn between philosophy of physics and physics itself. Some of the best work in the philosophy of physics is being done by physicists, as witnessed by the fact that several of the contributors to the volume are theoretical physicists: viz., Ellis, Emch, Harvey, Landsman, Rovelli, ‘t Hooft, the last of whom is a Nobel laureate. Key features - Definitive discussions of the philosophical implications of modern physics - Masterly expositions of the fundamental theories of modern physics - Covers all three main pillars of modern physics: relativity theory, quantum theory, and thermal physics - Covers the new sciences grown from these theories: for example, cosmology from relativity theory; and quantum information and quantum computing, from quantum theory - Contains special Chapters that address crucial topics that arise in several different theories, such as symmetry and determinism - Written by very distinguished theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, as well as by philosophers - Definitive discussions of the philosophical implications of modern physics - Masterly expositions of the fundamental theories of modern physics - Covers all three main pillars of modern physics: relativity theory, quantum theory, and thermal physics - Covers the new sciences that have grown from these theories: for example, cosmology from relativity theory; and quantum information and quantum computing, from quantum theory - Contains special Chapters that address crucial topics that arise in several different theories, such as symmetry and determinism - Written by very distinguished theoretical physicists, including a Nobel Laureate, as well as by philosophers. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of quantum theory commonly suppose that the observables of a quantum system form a Type-I factor von Neumann algebra. Such algebras always have atoms, which are minimal projection operators in the case of quantum mechanics. However, relativistic quantum field theory and the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics make extensive use of von Neumann algebras of more general types. This chapter addresses the question whether interpretations of quantum probability devised in the usual manner continue to apply in the (...) more general setting. Features of non-type I factor von Neumann algebras are cataloged. It is shown that these novel features do not cause the familiar formalism of quantum probability to falter, since Gleason's Theorem and the Lüders Rule can be generalized. However, the features render the problem of the interpretation of quantum probability more intricate. (shrink)

Recent attempts to cast Hume’s argument against miracles in a Bayesian form are examined. It is shown how the Bayesian apparatus does serve to clarify the structure and substance of Hume’s argument. But the apparatus does not underwrite Hume’s various claims, such as that no testimony serves to establish the credibility of a miracle; indeed, the Bayesian analysis reveals various conditions under which it would be reasonable to reject the more interesting of Hume’s claims.

In his 1768 essay ‘Concerning the Ultimate Foundation of the Differentiation of the Regions in Space’, Kant used incongruent counterparts in an attempt to refute a Leibnizian-relationist account of space. It is hard to imagine that scholars could be more divided on how to understand Kant’s argument and on how to assess its effectiveness. Two years later in 1770 incongruent counterparts resurface in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation, this time as part of a proof that our knowledge of space is intuitive. They (...) appear yet again in the Prolegomena and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science as part of the argument for transcendental idealism. Not surprisingly, scholars are also at odds on how to explain the shifts in the roles Kant wanted incongruent counterparts to play and how to assess the importance of these matters for the development of his critical philosophy. (shrink)

Es werden zwei Bedeutungen von „Infinitesimal“ unterschieden und zwei Thesen verteidigt: (1) Leibniz glaubte, das Infinitesimale in einer der beiden Bedeutungen sei nicht nur eine nützliche Erdichtung, sondern es sei sogar notwendig fur die Differentialrechnung; (2) die moderne Nichtstand-Analysis rechtfertigt weder Leibniz's Griinde fur die Einführung des Infinitesimalen noch seinen Gebrauch desselben.

This chapter discusses the Bayesian analysis of miracles. It is set in the context of the eighteenth-century debate on miracles. The discussion is focused on the probable response of Thomas Bayes to David Hume's celebrated argument against miracles. The chapter presents the claim that the criticisms Richard Price made against Hume's argument against miracles were largely solid.

Classical statistical mechanics has commanded a modest but steady amount of attention from philosophers of science. By contrast, there has been an almost total neglect of relativistic statistical mechanics, or more precisely, a neglect of the prospects and problems of producing a relativistic version of classical statistical mechanics. The neglect is undeserved, for this area offers a fascinating array of case studies for those concerned with the history and sociology of science, with the structure and dynamics of scientific theories, or (...) with foundations problems in physics. This paper is dedicated to the goal of ending the neglect. Towards this end, I will survey some of the issues which arise in attempting to marry statistical-thermodynamics with relativity theory. The choice of the issues to be discussed and their treatment naturally reflect my own preferences and prejudices, and I cannot hope for the reader’s agreement on all points. (shrink)

On Itamar Pitowsky’s subjective interpretation of quantum mechanics, “the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics [QM] is just a new kind of probability theory”, one whose probabilities correspond to odds rational agents would accept on the outcomes of gambles concerning quantum event structures. Our aim here is to ask whether Pitowsky’s approach can be extended from its original context, of quantum theories for systems with an finite number of degrees of freedom, to systems with an infinite number of degrees of (...) freedom, such as quantum field theory and quantum statistical mechanics in the thermodynamic limit. An impediment to generalization is that Pitowsky adopts the framework of event structures encoded by atomic algebras, whereas the algebras typical of QM for infinitely many degrees of freedom are usually non-atomic. We describe challenges to Pitowsky’s approach deriving from this impediment, and sketch and assess strategies Pitowsky might use to meet those challenges. Although we offer no final verdict about the eventual success of those strategies, a testament to the worth of Pitowsky’s approach is that attempting to extend it engages us in provocative foundational issues. (shrink)

Elay Shech and John Earman have recently argued that the common topological interpretation of the Aharonov–Bohm (AB) effect is unsatisfactory because it fails to justify idealizations that it presupposes. In particular, they argue that an adequate account of the AB effect must address the role of boundary conditions in certain ideal cases of the effect. In this paper I defend the topological interpretation against their criticisms. I consider three types of idealization that might arise in treatments of the (...) effect. First, Shech takes the AB effect to involve an idealization in the form of a singular limit, analogous to the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics. But, I argue, the AB effect itself features no singular limits, so it doesn’t involve idealizations in this sense. Second, I argue that Shech and Earman’s emphasis on the role of boundary conditions in the AB effect is misplaced. The idealizations that are useful in connecting the theoretical description of the AB effect to experiment do interact with facts about boundary conditions, but none of these idealizations are presupposed by the topological interpretation of the effect. Indeed, the boundary conditions for which Shech and demands justification are incompatible with some instances of the AB effect, so the topological interpretation ought not justify them. Finally, I address the role of the non-relativistic approximation usually presumed in discussions of the AB effect. This approximation is essential if—as the topological interpretation supposes—the AB effect constrains and justifies a relativistic theory of the electromagnetic interaction. In this case the ends justify the means. So the topological view presupposes no unjustified idealizations. (shrink)

I apply homotopy type theory to the hole argument as formulated by Earman and Norton. I argue that HoTT gives a precise sense in which diffeomorphism-related Lorentzian manifolds represent the same spacetime, undermining Earman and Norton’s verificationist dilemma and common formulations of the hole argument. However, adopting this account does not alleviate worries about determinism: general relativity formulated on Lorentzian manifolds is indeterministic using this standard of sameness and the natural formalization of determinism in HoTT. Fixing this indeterminism (...) results in a more faithful mathematical representation of general relativity as used by physicists. It also gives a substantive notion of general covariance. (shrink)

Religion is approached from an African point of view but is as accessible to readers who belong to non-African societies as it is to those who have grown up in ...

John Earman’s book is divided into two parts. In part 1 he argues that Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” is mostly unoriginal and, even where original, falls far short of Hume’s claim to provide “an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures.” Part 2 contains a selection of primary texts providing the context of the eighteenth-century debate over miracles, including a nice selection of Hume’s contemporary critics.

The idea that technologies can change moral beliefs and practices is an old one. But how, exactly, does this happen? This paper builds on an emerging field of inquiry by developing a synoptic taxonomy of the mechanisms of techno-moral change. It argues that technology affects moral beliefs and practices in three main domains: decisional (how we make morally loaded decisions), relational (how we relate to others) and perceptual (how we perceive situations). It argues that across these three domains there are (...) six primary mechanisms of techno-moral change: (i) adding options; (ii) changing decision-making costs; (iii) enabling new relationships; (iv) changing the burdens and expectations within relationships; (v) changing the balance of power in relationships; and (vi) changing perception (information, mental models and metaphors). The paper also discusses the layered, interactive and second-order effects of these mechanisms. (shrink)